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1 Introduction 
Recent transformations of the geographic scale and associated governance modes of 
public agency have recently attracted much interest by observers (Brenner, 2003; Gualini, 
2004; Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2004; Ward & Jonas, 2004). The ‘re-
scaling’ debate has highlighted the implications of shifting scales for social forces and 
populations, and investigated the impact of scales on the role of localities, regions and 
other socio-geographic formations involved the wider processes of global production and 
consumption.  
The emergence of cross-border regions (CBRs) provides a paradigmatic case for re-
scaling processes. A CBR is a territorial unit that comprises contiguous sub-national units 
from two or more nation states (Perkmann & Sum 2002a). Since borders were hermetic 
barriers only on rare occasions in the history of nation states, the existence of integrated 
cross-border spaces  is no novelty as such. What is new is that the construction of CBRs 
has become a more or less explicit strategic objective pursued by social forces within and 
beyond border regions. Jessop (2002) has commented on the significance of CBRs within 
the broader context of state restructuring and has identified a variety of different 
processes and/or strategies underlying and informing their emergence and consolidation.  
Empirically speaking, CBRs are very different in terms of their set-up, roles and social 
bases, depending on the institutional context they are embedded in. In Europe, CBRs tend 
to be groupings of local or regional authorities integrated into or attached to the multi-
level policy implementation networks constituted by EU regional policy (Perkmann 2003, 
Anderson, O’Dowd and Wilson 2003). In North America, the building of CBR tends to 
be more closely associated with particularist and issue-driven interests and they appear 
more loosely organised with a variety of involved private and public actors (Blatter 2004, 
Sparke 2002). In East-Asia, some CBRs are constituent part of the so-called growth 
triangles that, often in association with Special Economic Zones, exploit locational 
complementarities between territories with different factor prices and competency levels 
(Sum 2002, Sparke 2004).   
So far, the empirical study of cross-border regions and the theoretical debate on re-scaling 
have not been explicitly linked up; this is where this paper aims to make a contribution. 
Specifically, it addresses an aspect of re-scaling processes that has failed to gain much 
attention in the debate. Most contributions to the scale debate focus on two aspects: the 
forces that drive processes of re-scaling, and the consequences of re-scaling. In terms of 
the driving forces, much attention is paid to the underlying contradictions and functional 
imperatives of global capitalism, and re-scaling is often read as part of experimental 
strategies to re-structure the spatial scaffolding of global capitalism (Brenner 1998) and 
provide new configurations of structured coherence (Harvey 1982). In terms of the 
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consequences, authors have pointed to the role of re-scaled arrangements within strategies 
of neo-liberal restructuring and deregulation, sometimes at the expense of incumbent 
local communities (e.g. Swyngedouw 1996).  
However, less attention has been paid to how re-scaling actually occurs. What are the 
general circumstances in which new scales are constructed or transformed? What are the 
necessary ingredients of successful scale construction? This article proposes a framework 
for studying processes of re-scaling that can serve to answer these questions and analyse 
as well as compare concrete cases. While the framework categories are informed by the 
wider debate on state-theory and regionalisation, they are tested with a case study on the 
EUREGIO, a Dutch-German cross-border region. The choice of the EUREGIO as a case 
is pertinent insofar as it is a relatively advanced case of cross-border co-operation (CBC) 
and, at the same time, there is evidence that its model is followed widely by other similar 
initiatives across Europe (Perkmann 2003).  
The purpose of the exercise is to create an analytical template that can inform further case 
studies and comparative work aimed to identify different types of re-scaling strategies 
and scenarios. By demonstrating and uncovering empirical variation across various cases, 
this might help address the implicitly functionalist bias in much of the current debate on 
scales and re-scaling, suggesting that the emergence of new scales is invariably driven by 
the pressures of the global capitalist system. Not dissimilarly, neo-liberal approaches 
view the emergence of new scales, such as ‘natural economic zones’ and cross-border 
regions, as the de-facto manifestation of the economic imperatives of a globalised 
economy (Ohmae 1995).  
To achieve this objective, the article proceeds as follows. After a brief summary of the 
scale debate, an argument is made in favour of a territorial concept of scale in order to 
clarify the ambiguities associated with the concept. Inspired by Neo-Gramscian state 
theory as well as recent work on concrete re-scaling processes, such as ‘regionalisation’, 
a framework is then presented that encapsulates the main dimensions of re-scaling 
processes: political mobilisation, governance building and strategic unification. The 
framework is subsequently applied to an in-depth study of the emergence of the 
EUREGIO, whereby the presentation of the data is integrated with the discussion and 
analysis. Concluding, a few remarks are made as to how this framework can be used for 
studying further cases of re-scaling and an tentative typology of re-scaling processes is 
proposed.  
In terms of method, the empirical work in this article is based on information obtained 
from two sources: interviews and policy documentation. A total of twenty interviews 
were carried out with individuals involved in the EUREGIO, the Association of European 
Border Regions (AEBR) and the European Commission. They included EUREGIO 
officials, civil servants at member municipalities, municipal associations and districts 
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(Bezirksregierungen DE and regios NL ) on both sides of the border as well as the Dutch 
central government and the German Land governments of North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) and Lower Saxony. Interviews were ‘face to face’, lasted 1.5 hours on average 
and were semi-structured; they were all taped and transcribed. References to interview 
evidence are coded according to the format ‘i1’, ‘i2’, etc; a list is provided at the end of 
article. An equally important body of evidence was provided by printed and electronic 
documentation, in particular policy strategy and planning documents, policy evaluations 
and public communication materials produced by the EUREGIO, its member authorities, 
the European Commission, the AEBR, the ‘Institut für Landes - und 
Stadtentwicklungsforschung’ in North Rhine Westphalia and other organisations such as 
consultancies commissioned to evaluate policy measures.  
2 Scales and the politics of scale  
Commonly, ‘geographic scale’ can be referred to as a ‘graduated series, usually a nested 
hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size, such as the local, regional, national and 
supranational’, ‘each with a distinct geographic scope, that is, territorial extent’ (Delaney 
and Leitner 1997). In the recent literature, there has been a lively debate about the 
‘politics of scale’, a notion originally coined by Smith (1992), reflecting the assumption 
that gegraphical scales are socially constituted in historically specific ways and can hence 
become a stake in political struggles. This can be read against the background of the 
1970s 'locality debate' when a substantivist view of scale postulated intrinsic 
characteristics of the 'local' (Cooke 1989, Cox and Mair 1989, Duncan and Savage 1989). 
More recently, authors moved towards a relational conception of scale, emphasising the 
fact that geographic scales are socially constructed and that their precise manifestation 
can not be derived a priori (cf. Howitt, 1993).  
Brenner (2001) has made an important contribution to clarify the concept of the politics 
of scale. He argues against the semantic broadening of the scale concept that he observes 
in much of the literature on scale, notably an article by Marsden (2000). He proposes a 
'plural' meaning of scale, implying that the 'politics of scale' refers to a reconfiguration of 
particular orderings or hierarchies among geographic scales and not within a geographic 
scale. In other words, the politics of scale refers to the changing relationships between 
geographic scales, and the implications of such interscalar transformation for each of 
those scales in organisational, discursive and governance-related terms (ibid). 
Swyngedouw's contributions have elucidated the twin dimensions of scales as sites of 
regulation and arenas for social formations and struggles. On the first point, the fact that 
scales produce scalar effects can be seen as the very reason for why they become stakes in 
political struggles aimed at their transformation or maintainence; this is illustrated by 
Swyngedouw (1996) with the case of the restructuring of the Belgian mines (cf. also 
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Williams 1999). At the same time, he argues that ‘scale’ is underpinned by a temporary 
social compromise’ (Swyndegow 1996: 146). Scale henc e solidifies existing power 
relationships, regulates forms of cooperation, and defines power strategies. On the 
regional level, this process has been described by Lipietz as the creation of ‘regional 
armatures’, involving the establishment of a ‘space-for-itself’ endowed with the capacity 
to intervene on the part of a particular hegemonic bloc (Lipietz 1994). From such a 
social- integrative perspective, scale becomes relevant both as a site for control and 
domination as well as arena for conflicts and co-operation: The 'continuous reshuffling 
and re-organisation of spatial scales is an integral part of social strategies and struggles 
for control and empowerment' (ibid: 141).  
While these authors emphasise the socially constructed nature of scales qua institut ions, 
other authors have pointed out that scale also play an important role as (constructed) 
discursive referents in political life. Scale discourses, as ‘representational tropes'  (Jones 
1998) can be deployed in political action to provide rationales for specific political 
projects (Kelly 1997) As Smith argues, ‘by setting boundaries, scale can be constructed 
as a means of constraint and exclusion, a means of imposing identity, but a politics of 
scale can also become a weapon of expansion and inclusion, a means of enlarging 
identities. Scale offers guideposts in the recovery of space from annihilation’ (Smith 
1993: 14). 
This short overview has highlighted the regulatory, social- integrative and discursive 
dimensions of scale. The next section explores the relationship between re-scaling and 
territorial restructuring.  
Re-scaling as reconfiguration of territorial governance  
The re-scaling debate has highlighted the role of scales – and implicitly their governance 
effects – as stakes in political struggles. Brenner’s critique of the overextensive use of the 
scale concept – and his plea to focus on its ‘plural meaning’ - have done much provide 
better analytical focus. There is still considerable ambiguity left, however, as to what the 
concept of scale effectively refers to. On the one hand, ‘scale’ often appears to refer to the 
bounded spaces constituted by the territorial set-up of states, regions or localities that are 
arenas and objects of public governance. On the other, however, scale also appears to 
refer to the extension of processes, such as commodity chains, firm collaboration or 
capitalist accumulation in general. While the latter is an important aspect of tendencies 
such as globalisation, as pointed out by Jessop (1999) and implicit in Castells’ (1996) 
‘spaces of flows’, it is distinct from the creation and modification of scales understood as 
arenas and objects of public governance.  
The difference between the two meanings of ‘scale’ is spelled out by Dicken (1998: 13), 
who notes that, for instance, industrial commodity chains operate as ‘vertical’ processes 
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across increasingly extensive geographical scales and ‘[c]utting across these vertical 
structures are the territorially defined political-economic systems which (…) are 
manifested at different geographical scales’. In other words, vertical processes such as the 
manufacturing of industrial products, or the provision of financial services increasingly 
criss-cross horizontally constituted local, regional, national or supranational territories. A 
similar difference underlies Cox and Mair’s (1991) distinction between ‘spaces of 
dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’; here, ‘spaces of dependence’ refer to the 
exposure of local communities to processes of various spatial extension while ‘spaces of 
engagement’ emerge when localities constitute themselves as an ‘agent’, i.e. engage in 
territorial action.  
There is a strong argument for limiting the meaning of ‘scale’ to one of these dimensions 
in the interest of analytical clarity and I therefore limit my discussion of scales to their 
‘horizontal’ meaning, i.e. understood as spatially bounded units and objects of public 
governance. These units exist as socially constructed but nevertheless real social entities 
that are organised according to a specific social relation: territoriality (Sack 1986, Badie 
1995). It is due to collective governance institutions, e.g. governments, that these scales 
are de facto constituted as objects of governance and targeted by specific policies. 
Territorial re-scaling then involves the establishment of governance functions at a scale 
that is different from they were previously situated. In turn, these governance functions 
are performed by institutions associated each scale, i.e. relatively stabilised and legitimate 
patterns of social regulation. Therefore, each re-scaling process can be said to involve the 
institutionalisation of governance institutions at a new scalar level. A new scale can only 
be efficacious if it gains a sufficient degree of institutional thickness (Jessop 2002: 29), 
and can hence become an object for manipulation and contestation.  
A precondition for this is that social support is mobilised to provide resources and 
legitimacy for such territorial strategies; such support might be indirect as in the case of 
formal jurisdictions where it is provided via institutions of representative democracy. The 
mobilisation of social support is likely to go hand in had with the construction of 
narratives and discourses interwoven with the material (inter)dependencies involved in 
re-arranging and constructing scales (MacLeod 1998). In particular, for being a 'space of 
engagement', i.e. a territory with a capacity to act, it always must be discursively 
constituted as such. In this way, the locality (or a region) can develop a ‘politic al 
capacity’ (Ritaine 1998) to engage, for instance, in a territorial project of 
competitiveness. These ensuing agents are territorial actors who act, as it were, ‘on 
behalf’ of a territory and whose constitutive legitimacy lies in their capacity to exert 
relative control over a spatially bounded area.  
Such arrangements rely on various articulations of a specific social relation: territoriality. 
In this respect, Sack’s (1986) rather voluntarist definition of territoriality as 'the attempt 
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by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people phenomena, and 
relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’ or Cox’s (1991) 
understanding that territories are ‘bounded areas or arenas in which conflict occurs’ cover 
only spec ific aspects of territory.  
More comprehensively, territoriality is a social relation that puts social subjects in 
relation to each other in the basis of a set of rules linked to a bounded geographical space. 
As Collinge (1999) notes, territoriality refers to the ‘socially mediated spatiality of 
political relations, producing formations which are interpellated as units such as 
„nations“, „regions“ and „localities“’.  
As any social relation, ‘territoriality’ is an abstract principle for creating and reproducing 
social order but, at the same time, it has to be regarded as historically constructed and 
historically evolving. Badie (1995) shows how ‘modern territoriality’ emerged as a 
counter-movement to other modes of socio-spatial organisation, such as the empire, the 
feudal system or the city-state at the end of the middle ages. He observes that, at the 
transition from feudal territory to modern territoriality, ‘bounding’ became the instrument 
of choice for these new strategies of domination [via modern territoriality, my translation] 
(Badie 1995: 33). The bounding of spaces went hand in hand with the establishment of 
(the idea of) a single sovereign authority equipped with exclusive power over a 
homogenous territory, as opposed to the entangled and multiple patchwork instituted by 
feudal domination over land and populations. 
The way in which territories are defined, and how they relate to each other – both 
between and within states – constitute an important moment for defining the relative 
positions of various social actors. In the process of territorialisation, ‘politics’ can be seen 
as the strategic and political actions underlying the formation of territory (Steinberg 1994: 
3). It follows that each actual instantiation of territory must be regarded as the product of 
social struggles, in other words: as socially but not necessarily intentionally constructed.  
Concluding, for the sake of this present investigation into the issue of scale, territories can 
be characterised as specific institutionalised forms of social representation and 
domination based upon bounded geographic spaces and/or its populations. Importantly, 
territories are also sites of governance as their institutional set-up will generate effects 
that will be structurally selective vis-à-vis specific social forces on different scales. Thus, 
they provide institutionalised power positions for social actors for whom (the control of) 
territory becomes a resource. From such a perspective, the question of scale and, 
particularly, of re-scaling becomes relevant because shifting spatial boundaries and the 
government functions associated with them re-configure the social and productive bases 
of territorial entities and modify thereby, among others, the resource position of territorial 
actors, and of course, of the territorial communities as a whole. It is clear that the 
strategies underlying such re-scaling processes will therefore be subject to social 
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contestation as they can be expected to significantly affect the power, resource 
appropriation and life chances of a multiplicity of social groups organised at different 
levels. Narratives and discourses constructing a scale as spatial communities as well as, 
more instrumentally, as object of intervention, will play an important role in these 
processes of social contestation and governance re-alignment.  
Concluding, a territorial notion of scale sheds light on three interconnected aspects of 
scale: their nature as social formations, their function as sites of governance and their 
construction via narratives and discourses. These aspects will be addressed more 
comprehensively below.  
Analysing rescaling processes  
As mentioned before, most contributions to the scale debate focus on two aspects: the 
forces that drive processes of re-scaling, and the consequences of re-scaling. However, 
less attention has been paid to how re-scaling actually occurs. What are the circumstances 
in which new scales are constructed or transformed? What are the necessary ingredients 
of successful scale construction? In the following, a framework is proposed that will 
serve to analyse concrete cases of re-scaling. The framework lays out the key dimensions 
of re-scaling processes which are illustrated with the example of a specific case study. 
While beyond the scope of this paper, future comparat ive case study work might explore 
degrees of empirical variation across each of the dimensions of the framework and 
establish different types of newly emerging scales and the circumstances in which they 
emerge.  
The dimensions presented below are derived from several theoretical sources. First, the 
scaling debate has pointed to several core aspects relevant within re-scaling processes, 
largely informed by thinking based on the strategic -relational approach and regulation 
theory (Jessop 2001). Generally speaking, such approaches postulate the existence of 
historically specific social formations, representing solidified yet unstable compromises 
among social forces, and institutionally constituted via modes of calculation and 
regulatory institutional forms producing specific effects for wider economic and social 
processes (e.g. MacLeod 1998). In line with such thinking, for instance, is Swyngedow’s 
distinction between scales as regulatory forms and arenas for social formations and 
struggles. 
A further conceptual impetus comes from existing accounts of re-scaling processes, 
notably ‘regionalization’ (Balme 1996). Keating (1997) has provided a useful template 
for analysing a specific type of re-scaling process, regionalisation, by distinguishing 
between the aspects of political mobilization for processes of region-building, 
institutional restructuring resulting in new governance structures and functional needs 
providing rationales for the actors involved in the construction of new scales. Similarly, 
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Gualini (2004) distinguishes between changes in substantive rationales, procedural 
rationales and interactional-relational rationales affecting the creation of new territorial 
scales in a scenario of ‘experimental regionalism’.  
In light of the scale debate as well as the regionalisation literature, the following 
dimensions appear to be at the core of re-scaling processes; they can be characterised as 
social, procedural and substantial respectively:   
(a) political mobilisation, i.e. the formation of a social basis underpinning the creation or 
transformation of a scale. If scales, as noted by Swyngedow, solidify existing power 
relationships within a temporary hegemonic space, than scales are underpinned and 
reproduced by specific coalitions of social forces. Political mobilisation then refers to the 
process through which these coalitions are built and maintained over time.  
(b) governance building, referring to emerging arrangements for channelling political and 
other interests and co-ordinating decision-making. Governance is used here in its broad 
sense, including exchange, hierarchy and heterarchy (Jessop 1998) but empirically it is 
most likely that new scales will rely more narrowly on complex configurations of 
heterarchic arrangements such as networks (e.g. Balme and Jouve 1996).  
(c) strategic unification, referring to the construction of a new scale as a unit and object 
for politico-territorial intervention, constituting a link between strategic intervention and 
the (intended) effects to be achieved on economic and social processes affecting the 
territorial scale. Effectively, this aspect refers to the substantive, ‘project’ dimension 
infusing social formations with shared visions and cognitive guidelines for action and 
intervention (Colomy 1998).   
Having defined these core dimensions of scale building, they are now applied to the case 
study of the EUREGIO.  
3 Case study: the EUREGIO cross-border region  
The general context  
The EUREGIO is a Dutch-German cross-border region in the area of Enschede (NL) and 
Münster (DE), involving approx. 140 local authorities with a total population of  3.2m.1 
Founded in 1958, it is among the oldest cross-border regions in Europe and has 
established itself as a legitimate and competent agency responsible for cross-border 
matters in this spec ific geographic area.2 The EUREGIO is governed by a set of formal 
bodies, most notably an executive board composed by the key member authorities, and a 
cross-border ‘parliament’, the EUREGIO Council. A single secretariat with approx. 30 
staff functions as the executive branch of the EUREGIO and covers a variety of local 
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policy areas ranging from spatial planning and economic policy to social and cultural 
matters.  
It has a diversified stream of income of approx. €5.7m (as of 2005), partly from a 
voluntary membership fee drawn from member authorities. Most of its income, however, 
is derived from its role as a programme manager for the local implementation of Interreg, 
the EU’s support programme for CBC (Perkmann 1999). Interreg is part of EU regional 
policy and provides financial support for local public -sector collaboration across member 
state borders resulting in structural economic benefits to border areas. Total Interreg 
funding amounts to approx. 2.3 per cent of the EU’s Cohesion policy budget. 3 
The allocation of Interreg funds is governed by Steering Committees responsible for 
small-scale border areas, composed by local actors and central or Land authorities from 
the participating countries. The EUREGIO is an active member of the Steering 
Committee responsible for the Dutch-German border area but, across Europe, local CBR 
organisations are not always involved in the formal decision-making process. This means, 
the EUREGIO is effectively also a policy implementation partner of the EU commission 
for these reg ional policy measures in the Dutch-German border areas.  
In the following, the three core dimensions of the EUREGIO as a newly emerging scale 
are reported and discussed in detail.  
Political mobilisation 
The origins of the EUREGIO date back to the 1950s when municipal associations on both 
sides of the border organised the first cross-border conference. The EUREGIO was 
established as a joint body of three inter-municipal associations which, on their part, had 
been founded with the objective of pursuing regional collaboration to solve the structural 
problems of the border areas.4 The initial period was characterised by a process of 
coalition-building across a number of municipalities on both sides of the border that were 
initially organised within groupings separately for each side of the border.  
Their primary interest was to create a platform for the improvement of the local and 
regional infrastructures which, in the eyes of the local elites, were neglected on the part of 
the Land  (North Rhine Westphalia) and central governments. The situation was critical 
on the German side where high unemployment and structural problems persisted (CoE, 
1972). The area was among the poorest in Germany, and suffered from restructuring 
processes in the textiles sector which accounted for more than 50% of the industrial 
labour force in the 60s with local rates of up to 80% (Goinga, 1995: 20). In addition, 20% 
of the labour force still worked in agriculture.  
While the municipal groupings were initially unilateral they soon recognised that linking 
up with their counterparts on the other side of the border would enhance the legitimacy of 
their claims. Both areas had similar socio-economic structures – partly inherited from a 
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pre-nation-state past – and the local actors realised that their constituencies suffered from 
various border effects due to the marginalisation within their respective national 
economies. Co-operation also appeared promising in addressing the day-to-day border 
problems, related to commuter flows, business relationships and social contacts.  
Even though European integration was at an embryonic level, the existence of a genuine 
cross-border platform enabled the EUREGIO actors to attach a higher level of legitimacy 
to their claims vis-à-vis their higher level authorities. Very early, the EUREGIO actors 
attempted to lobby supra-local actors, such as their national central or Land authorities as 
well as later the Council of Europe and the European Commission, in relation to regional 
policy measures. The cross-border coalition was successful, for instance, in influencing 
transport infrastructure decisions, such as the building of motorways connecting the area 
to the main German networks or the preservation of railway lines (cf. Raich, 1995:: 155; 
i5, i6).  
This political mobilisation was clearly driven by bureaucratic interests and remained 
restricted to the realm of public administration without involving a broader popular 
mobilisation. However, from early on, the municipal groupings involved, and in turn their 
member municipalities, sought a degree of broader-based legitimacy for their cross-
border strategies as the attention shifted towards building governance structures for the 
newly-emerging cross-border space. CBC was positioned both as a way of seeking 
reconciliation after the brutalities of WWII as well as a contribution to the ongoing 
process of European integration (Schack, 1998). In fact, the initial concrete activities of 
the EUREGIO focused on cultural matters and ‘know your neighbour’ initiatives which 
were benevolently regarded by the central governments. This meant that both national 
and supranational authorities could be successfully approached. An illustrative example is 
the establishment of the ‘Mozer Commission’ in 1971, a strongly ceremonial body which 
still exists today and involves a large number of members, involving higher-level 
authorities, sponsors, guests and advisors. Also, as CBC became part of standard activity 
repertoire of the local authorities’, they sought to emulate a regional democracy by 
establishing the ‘EUREGIO Council’ in 1978. The Council is a para-parliamentary body 
constituted by 64 elected politicians appointed by the member authorities; however, it has 
no formal legislative competencies although, formally speaking, it is the most 
authoritative among the EUREGIO bodies. 
Summarising, political mobilisation in the EUREGIO was driven by administrative and 
policy-oriented considerations emerging within the local authorities and their umbrella 
associations. While the initial impetus resulted from the interest of attracting resource 
from higher-level authorities, such as the Land, national governments and, later, 
supranational authorities such as the European Commission, subsequently political 
support moved to include the building of governa nce structures for a cross-border space 
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as a whole. In part, however, this was still informed by the interest of gaining access to 
resources made available particularly by the European Commission. As will become clear 
from the account given below, the building of cross-border policy co-ordination 
structures was particularly relevant for being able to draw upon funding provided by 
Interreg, the European Commission’s programme to support cross-border integration. 
Both initial political mobilisation and ongoing support for EUREGIO CBC can therefore 
still be regarded as primarily driven by administrative rationales.   
Governance building 
CBRs represent a specific challenge within public governance due their atypical, non-
nested territorial set-up: As their constituent parts – municipalities, districts and other 
subnational jurisdictions – belong to different nation states, they do not operate in a 
conventional context of public administration defined by legal competencies and 
decision-making mechanisms rooted in public law. CBRs do not have ‘governments’ but 
rely on voluntary co-operation within a context of pragmatically defined and mutually 
recognised set of rules. For a long time, they even operated outside public law and 
resorted to civil law arrangements (Beyerlin 1998). They can therefore be seen as 
exemplary for a type of public agency that has been described as ‘governance’ by authors 
from a variety of backgrounds in regional and urban studies, political science and 
organisational studies (Jessop 1998, Le Galès 1998, Amin/Hausner 1997, Kooiman 
1993). In various forms, the principle of governance – often contrasted to government – 
has widely been connected to the operation of networks among parties willing to co-
operate in the absence of a hierarchical instance (Messner 1997, Hanf/O’Toole 1992, 
Marin/Mayntz 1991).  
In light of these challenges, the main question is how a system of networked relationships 
can be effective in producing a ‘scale’. The considerations below provide an example for 
such a working arrangement for the specific case of the EUREGIO. Empirically speaking, 
in the EUREGIO, networked governance is instituted on three levels: (a) the EUREGIO 
secretariat, acting as skilful and knowledgeable network broker; (b) a horizontal border-
crossing network of local authorities; (c) a vertical, ‘multi- level’ network of authorities 
including local, regional, Land, central state and EU actors.  
The EUREGIO as organisation 
From an organisational viewpoint, the nodal point of the EUREGIO is its secretariat, 
w hich over the last forty years has developed into an organisation with a high degree of 
specialist competence. The secretariat has no constitutionally instituted competencies nor 
does it have any guaranteed income streams. At the same time, its mandate is relatively 
undefined. This enables the secretariat to act in an entrepreneurial fashion as long as it 
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has the backing of the member authorities. This relative discretion in defining and 
expanding its tasks has been widely used by the EUREGIO secretariat.  
This is reflected in its ability to generate a stable resource flow to maintain its operations. 
The EUREGIO disposes over a considerable income from sources not related to Interreg, 
notably from a membership fee charged to the member authorities, approx. EUR .30 per 
inhabitant in 2005.  
The proceeds from the membership fee enable the EUREGIO to pay the overheads out of 
its own budget. The secretariat proved successful in raising project-related funding long 
before Interreg was launched. In most cases, local funds were complemented by 
contributions from NRW and the European Commission. More recently, the secretariat 
successfully bid for pilot-projects from various other DGs of the European Commission. 
As a result, today the secretariat operates a range of activities that strengthen its profile as 
cross-border regional advice and citizen’s service centre.  
Unlike other Euroregions, the secretariat always sought to avoid overdependence on the 
mostly temporary resources provided by non-local authorities. Although Interreg 
constituted a major boost in terms of financial revenues and organisational growth, the 
secretariat has managed to diversify its revenues and secure stable funding from local 
sources.  
The EUREGIO organisation has established itself as a highly regarded regional 
development agency in the Dutch-German border area. Based on its expertise and local 
connectedness, the secretariat exerts considerable informal influence upon EU 
programme implementation, for several reasons: First, by acting as a project animator, it 
ensures that all available funds are effectively allocated (i2, i5, i18). Secondly, it has 
made itself indispensable as a network broker. For genuine cross-border projects, project 
applicants need partners on the other side of the border; the relevant contacts are usually 
established by the secretariat (i7). Thirdly, the secretariat uses its administrative expertise 
to turn initial ideas into project applications ready for submission to the Interreg Steering 
Committee.  
The development of a strong organisational basis – enabled by a steadily increasing 
resource flow – was crucial for providing the local actors with access to Interreg 
implementation. In the 1980s, the member municipalities agreed to increase their 
financial contribution in the expectation that this would help to secure a substantial local 
impact on the allocation of future European funding. The EUREGIO grasped a strategic 
opportunity when it was still undecided whether a large-scale CBC support programme 
would be launched.  
The result was that when Interreg was finally launched, with 15 staff members the 
EUREGIO secretariat was the natural candidate for programme management.5 It had 
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positioned itself as the strategy unit responsible for a range of tasks no other organisation 
could deal with, becoming the undisputed agency for ‘mobilising the region’ (i5).  
Concluding, the role of the secretariat doubles as both a network broker, securing 
ongoing co-operation among the members of the network, and a policy entrepreneur, 
continuously seeking to introduce policy innovations to widen the role and impact of the 
EUREGIO (Mintrom 1997, Roberts and King 1996, Christopoulous 2001). It developed 
the EUREGIO from a loose network with strong ceremonial elements into a regional 
policy agency that has assumed the self-defined mandate of transforming the cross-border 
region into a ‘central location in North-western Europe’ with 20m consumers within 
150km (Gabbe, 1985: 95). The secretariat has assumed the role of a ‘functional 
government’ (Beck 1997) not on the basis of a strong formal mandate but through a 
skilful moderation and solidification of the horizontal and vertical policy network 
structures the EUREGIO is embedded in. They are discussed below.  
The local network  
As a non-mandatory body, the EUREGIO depends on voluntary co-operation among 
local authorities although common rules and obligations have been defined via formalised 
agreements. The member authorities are linked via a set of networks that tend to have 
visible, formalised front-ends as formal bodies. The most important among these is the 
so-called ‘Working Group’ that acts as a supervisory board and involves senior civil 
servants and political office-bearers from the most powerful and active member 
authorities on both sides of the border. In addition, there are a number of ‘Working 
Circles’, specialising in single policy areas and involving expert civil servants from local 
and supralocal authorities and interest groups. They deal with project-oriented work in 
various policy fields, such as economic policy, social matters, or ‘daily border problems’. 
The most important feature of these relationships is their technocratic nature as the main 
work load is carried by the expert civil servants. Such technocratic networks are usually 
more stable than purely ‘topocratic’ networks composed of politicians and tend to be 
committed to problem-solving as opposed to pure bargaining (Rhodes, 1990, Benz 1995). 
This is despite the fact that strategic EUREGIO matters are usually dealt with personally 
by the top officials who act more like political generalists and, hence, ‘topocrats’ 
representing their constituency.  
Decision-making and co-ordination even in technocratic networks can be notoriously 
difficult, especially when it comes to issues of distribution or even re-distribution (Beck 
1997). Conflicts, for instance, arise over the geographical distribution of project funding 
or decisions favouring larger authorities over smaller ones, or urban municipalities over 
rural ones.  
The EUREGIO developed a varie ty of mechanisms to reduce the conflictuality and 
complexity of decision-making within the local cross-border networks. With the 
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secretariat playing an active part as a network broker, the EUREGIO developed a set of 
norms that maintain a usually productive problem-solving climate, for instance a 
commitment to the ‘long-term’ and a sense of distributional fairness. A balanced 
distribution of project funding over time (to mitigate limited resources) and across space 
(to secure commitment) is seen as crucial for unifying particularist interests behind a 
common objective (i5). There is no explicit or implicit formula for distributing Interreg-
support between the two countries or between different constituencies (i1, i7, i11). The 
secretariat enjoys an uncontested reputation for allocating funds even-handedly. This is 
why decision-making on projects is usually non-conflictual and smaller municipalities are 
discouraged from defecting. A further factor in reducing the complexity of decision-
making in networks is a relatively small number of participants (Messner 1997). In this 
respect, the municipal associations in the EUREGIO network play a key role by 
restricting the number of (relevant) participants, while representing the smaller members. 
At the same time, they are important in securing the commitment of the participating 
municipalities, even by sometimes paying for their membership (i2).  
The vertical network  
Apart from the local network, the EUREGIO is also part of a vertical, multi-level network 
involving regional, national and European policy agencies, essentially constituting a EU 
cohesion policy policy implementation network (Heinelt and Smith 1996). These 
supralocal network linkages provide access to a significant amount of resources, 
complementing the local resources which can be seen as complementary at best. These 
relationships were established long before the EUREGIO was given its mandate in 
Interreg implementation. Its early successes all crucially depended on the support of non-
local authorities, in particular the Land NRW, the Dutch government and the European 
Commission. 
The Dutch central government and North Rhine-Westphalia have traditionally adopted a 
‘CBC-friendly’ attitude towards their border municipalities. On the German side, special 
measures for border areas in spatial planning and economic policy have been deployed 
since the sixties. North Rhine-Westphalia has also experimented with a variety of 
innovative regional policy schemes. Initiatives such as ‘regional conferences’ sought to 
delegate regional policy to municipalities and districts by involving them into the design 
and implementation of structural measures in problem areas (Voelzkow 1995). Evidently, 
the regional mobilisation in border areas, brokered by Euroregions, is similar to these 
regional conferences.  
Even before the launch of Interreg, the European Commission joined the vertical network 
as an important catalyst and player. Long before Interreg was launched, the EUREGIO 
had been lobbying the European Commission for CBC support. In 1972, the European 
Commission helped to fund a first cross-border development plan for the EUREGIO. A 
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similar solution was found for the 1987 action programme before the EUREGIO 
succeeded in attracting a substantial amount of European funding under art. 10 ERDF for 
a series of ‘innovative’ pilot projects. 
In the 1990s, the loose network relationships were sedimented into a more formal 
arrangement, the Interreg Steering Committee, involving the economics ministries of the 
Netherlands, NRW and Lower Saxony, the Dutch provinces and the German district 
authorities.  
De facto, within the confines of its area, the EUREGIO has become an important 
implementation partner for the European Commission. Due to its expertise and authority 
in the local context, it enjoys a status that goes far beyond it relatively weak formal 
position in the vertical network. The EUREGIO is a full member of the Steering 
Committee and is entitled to propose its chairman.  
Formally, the Steering Committee is the ultimate instance in the decision-making process 
on the allocation of Interreg funds. Practically speaking, however, decisions are rarely 
imposed on the EUREGIO actors, effectively valuing the professionalism of the 
secretariat. The interview evidence points to high-trust relationships across the vertical 
networks (i10, i11, i14), often constituted by long-term working relationships among 
individuals and high ideological commitment to the CBC cause.  
But, apart from such motives created by the social embeddedness of network contacts, for 
the Dutch and NRW authorities, there is also an administrative rationale for co-operating 
with the EUREGIO actors. A senior NRW official observed: ‘… you can’t pull projects 
like a rabbit out of a hat’ (i11). As the need to secure the cross-border character of 
Interreg projects is taken seriously, the EUREGIO has a crucial role as a project animator 
to secure the successful allocation of Interreg funds. The reliance on the EUREGIO is 
reflected by the fact that the North Rhine-Westphalia and Dutch ministries do not in 
general co-ordinate their positions on specific projects prior to SC meetings (i11).  
The involvement of the EUREGIO in this vertical network mirrors the general networked 
set-up of policy implementation in EU regional polic y described as multi- level 
governance (Hooghe 1996; Benz and Eberlein 1999). Given the importance of Interreg, it 
is also relevant for maintaining the stability of the local network described above. In fact, 
the local EUREGIO network operates in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ cast by the Steering 
Committee. 6 To avoid rejection of project proposals by the Land or central government, 
the EUREGIO makes sure that projects have the structural economic impact required by 
the structural funds regulations. The relatively clear criteria for evaluating project 
proposals simplify the decision-making process by providing rules to be routinely 
followed. In case of doubt, the uncertainty-reducing function of these rules is 
complemented by the ‘shadow’ of authority exerted by the Dutch and NRW governments 
as well as the European Commission that is channelled through the secretariat and can be 
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used to discipline the members of the local network. Hence, the EUREGIO secretariat 
performs an interface function by mediating between th e network of EUREGIO members 
and the supranational network crystallised in the Steering Committee. On the one hand, 
the supranational authorities trust in the secretariat’s administrative expertise and its 
ability to prioritise the ‘objective’ quality of projects over the particularist interests of 
project applicants. On the other, the local authorities perceive the secretariat as their agent 
and representative vis-à-vis the higher -level authorities. It can be followed from the high 
level of interdependence between the local network and the vertical network relationships 
that, as a newly emerging scale, the EUREGIO is highly dependent on its integration into 
the supranational policy framework provided by the EU.  
Strategic unification  
This aspect of emergin g new scales refers to their construction of the region as an object 
intervention. Early in its history, the EUREGIO actors began to underpin their institution-
building strategies by referring to the cross-border space as a unified object to be shaped 
and constructed (CoE 1972: 111). The ambition of turning the EUREGIO into a 
‘functional unit in all spheres of life’,  ‘by superseding intra-regional locational 
competition via developing a specialisation for the unit as a whole’ originated in the late 
sixties, if not earlier (ibid). The EUREGIO was to be transformed from a separated set of 
marginalised border economies into an integrated economic space. This strategy was 
formalised as the ‘region principle’ (Gabbe 1985: 94) and aims to create a ‘centrally 
located area in North-western Europe’ able to cater for 20m consumers within a radius of 
150km (Gabbe 1985: 95). The creation of cross-border development concepts played a 
major role in this construction of the EUREGIO as a cross-border territorial object of 
intervention. Such conceptual guidelines defining the intervention space, the objectives to 
be pursued and the measures to be taken were the precondition for attracting resources 
from higher level authorities and to develop the EUREGIO from a loose network with 
strong ceremonial elements into a regional policy agency.  
In 1971, a first EUREGIO ‘structural analysis’ was carried out with EU and national 
support (Malchus 1986: 36). The study proposed a bundle of objectives and some general 
guidelines for a possible regional programme (CoE 1972). A further step was the 
completion of the 1987 ‘action programme’ which contained a long-term development 
perspective as well as more detailed measures for a multiannual period. The latter part 
constituted the blueprint for the Interreg Operational Programmes that were later 
submitted to the European Commission. The development programmes were produced on 
the basis of expert input provided by a research institute operated by NRW, and presented 
scientific rationales for local CBC as an efficient strategy for overcoming the structural 
problems of border areas.  
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The development programmes were relevant both as planning mechanisms and as social-
integrative devices. As a multi-annual bundle of project fields and project ideas, 
distributed evenly both geographically as well as in terms of policy areas, they offered the 
EUREGIO members an expected probability for gaining access to funding opportunities 
in the future. By opening up a time horizon associated with a stream of resources to be 
distributed among a relatively large number of actors, they created incentives to co-
operate and to expend resources for a secretariat. 
The idea of designing locally managed, integrated, multi-sectoral programmes for border 
areas was conceptually aligned with the emerging regional policy of the European 
Community from the mid-seventies onwards. The ‘programme approach’ to regional 
policy propagated by the European Commission (Tömmel 1994) was rapidly translated 
into a major catalyst for the mobilisation of border areas by providing a cognitive 
reference for a new object of governance: a ‘cross-border region’.  
The rather technical construction of the CBR as an integrated region was complemented 
by a set of more ceremonial discourses that in turn helped mobilise political support both 
on the local and supralocal levels. The central discourse is constituted around the concept 
of the European border. In the context of an integrating Europe, the ‘border’ assumes the 
quality of a special symbolic marker that was mobilised very effectively by the 
EUREGIO. By transcending national borders, the EUREGIO claimed to be contributing 
to European integration ‘on the small scale’. Thus, the EUREGIO is perceived as the 
realisation of an integrated Europe that is close to the citizens, unbureaucratic and local.  
Similar views are shared by the European Commission and some academic observers. For 
the European Commission, and EU-friendly national governments, cross-border regions 
functions as ‘test beds for the construction of Europe’ (Schulz 1998: 15, cf. also 
Tränhardt 1993). The background to this discourse is that, if communities on both sides 
of the borders were to co-operate in the hope of gaining from commonly produced public 
goods, then commonalties had to be emphasised at the expense of national differences. 
‘Europe’ offered itself as the most obvious referent to be invoked as a common identity; 
it was also an effective symbolic resource vis-à-vis the higher -level actors, i.e. the Land 
and province authorities, the central governments and the European Commission. 
4 Conclusions and implications  
This article proposed a framework for analysing processes of rescaling and illustrated the 
framework with a case study of the EUREGIO. Applied to this specific case, the analysis 
showed:  
(a) Political mobilisation occurred by establishing collective action among local 
authorities on both sides of the Dutch-German border area. The initial interest 
was to create a platform that could leverage the combined political clout of the 
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border authorities vis-à-vis higher level authorities in the attempt to attract 
attention and resources to the area. With the advent of new regional policy 
models that assigned local actors a stronger role in policy design and 
implementation – particularly promoted by the European Commission (Tömmel 
1994) – political support was mobilised for creating and maintaining cross-border 
governance structures addressing the cross-border space as a new unit of 
intervention. For both aspects, administrative considerations were primary, and in 
fact the actors supporting the CBR were almost exclusively local authorities 
while there was little involvement or interest on the part of other type of 
collective actors in the EUREGIO.  
(b) Governance building in the EUREGIO focused on the intersection of a local 
policy network involving local authorities and a vertical policy network 
involving higher -level authorities, i.e. central governments and the European 
Commission. An entrepreneurially acting agency, the secretariat, plays an active 
role as network broker, project animator and carrier of expertise. Both networks 
are highly interdependent. On the one hand, membership of local border-crossing 
network would lose much of its attraction without a constant resource flow being 
secured through funding provided by higher-level authorities. On the other, the 
vertical network relies on the motivational role and decentralised intelligence of 
the local network for the inception and orderly execution of funded cross-border 
projects. The governance aspect of the EUREGIO highlights the ‘inter -scalar’ 
dimension of re-scaling strategies. The newly emerging territorial unit was 
constituted in high interdependence with higher-level scales, in particular the EU 
as a supra-regional policy maker. This process did hence not only involve 
‘scaling down’ the level at which cross-border development measures are co-
ordinated but it also involved a change in the logic of co-ordination, or mode of 
governance, as observed in other cases of shifting scales. In this specific case, 
instead of highly bureaucratic decision-making within so-called ‘inter-state 
commissions’ (Aykaç 1994) operating on a national level, the EUREGIO 
instituted a ‘grass-roots’ agency operating in a constitutional grey space to 
achieve a far higher degree of mobilisation and policy commitment to cross-
border regional measures on the part of local actors.  
(c) Strategic unification in the EUREGIO was inspired by a shared vision around 
building a ‘functional unit’ serving as object of intervention for unified cross-
border policy measures in ‘all spheres of life’. The cross-border region was 
constructed as an object for intervention via a series of ‘development concepts’ 
that were informed by scientific -bureaucratic regional policy rationales. These 
documents served as cognitive and social- integrative devices ensuring the 
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concertation of the involved networks around a constant and stable ‘theme of 
interaction’ that has been recognised as an important factor for the stability of 
networks (Héritier 1995). Simultaneously, this bureaucratic vision was 
underpinned by a more ceremonial discourse centred around the ‘European’ 
dimension of the cross-border region.  
 
 
Table 1: Logics of scale construction within cross-border regions 
 EUREGIO  Variations  
Political mobilisation Administrative  Ethno-linguistic, popular (Tyrol)  
Boosterist local economic interests 
(Cascadia)  
Governance  building Policy 
entrepreneurship in 
multi- level network   
Inter-state co-ordination (Indonesia-
Malaysia-Singapore Triangle)  
Loosely coupled public -private neworks 
(Greater China)  
Strategic unification  Cross-border 
economic space 
Exploitation of complementarities 
(Asian growth triangles)  
Addressing externalities (US/Mexico) 
 
The aim of this article was not to present the EUREGIO as the only possible model for 
the construction of new scales. In fact, the features exhibited by this case can be expected 
to differ strongly from other cases although there might be a certain degree of 
isomorphism in relation to other cases of European CBRs. Nevertheless, the dimensions 
of the proposed framework can be used for creating variation across different cases of 
scale construction. An initial typology, outlining both the features specific to the 
EUREGIO as well as potential variations, is presented in Table 1. Accordingly, for 
instance, the type of political mobilisation in the EUREGIO can be described as 
‘administrative’ but in other cases the type of actors and coalitions might be different. For 
instance, in the Austro-Italian border area, the building of CBC tends to be informed by 
popular mobilisation driven by party politics (Luverà 1996), or in the case of Cascadia, 
by a coalition of ‘boosterist’ private-sector interests and think-tanks (Sparke 2002).  
In turn, governance building in the EUREGIO was shaped by a self-appointed agency and 
network broker that, as a successful policy entrepreneur, established a productive degree 
of interdependence between the local network of municipalities and the policies of a 
supranational actor, the EU. By contrast, other cases of scale building rely to a stronger 
degree of inter -agency co-ordination on the national level, as for instance the Indonesia-
Malaysia-Singapore Triangle (Grundy-Warr, Peachy and Perry 1999). Growth triangles 
such as Greater China, in turn, are constituted by a complex web of loosely coupled 
networks of actors spanning the boundaries between private entrepreneurship and public 
agency (Sum 2002).  
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Strategic unification, finally, was provided by an image of a homogenous cross-border 
economic space overcoming the disadvantages associated with marginal border location. 
In cases such as regional co-operation arrangements on the US-Mexican, border is it 
rather the attempt to mitigate negative social and environmental externalities that come to 
be the unifying discourse and strategic impetus for CBC (Scott 1999). The exploitation of 
complementarities, expected to induce major boosts of investment and growth, are at the 
centre of unification discourses in the South-East Asian growth triangles (Sparke et al 
2004).  
Having proposed a framework for analysing re-scaling processes and sketched a tentative 
typology, a few concluding comments are  in order in view of further research. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to present a comprehensive typology of scale construction 
that not only includes CBRs but potentially other processes involving the creation of new 
or modified scales as different as macro-regional collaboration or special economic 
zones. However, it has been shown that re-scaling processes vary widely in terms of 
political mobilisation, governance building and strategic unification. This indicates that it 
is not appropriate to hold single causal factors responsible for re-scaling processes tout-
court, and that there is indeed a variety of logics at work, possibly in dependence of the 
wider institutional contexts in which they occur. This is in fact an important theme for 
future research. A related open question is whether the features of re-scaling processes 
‘cluster’ into specific configurations in the sense that particular modes of political 
mobilisation tend to go hand in hand with specific modes of governance and specific 
discourses of unification.  
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Annex: Interview codes  
i1 Provincie Overijssel, Zwolle (NL)  
i2   Landkreis Grafschaft Bentheim, Nordhorn (DE)  
i3  Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Regio Oost, Arnhem (NL) 
i4   Bezirkregierung Weser -Ems, Oldenburg (DE) 
i5   EUREGIO, Gronau (DE) (group interview).  
i6  Bezirkregierung, Abteilung Regionalplanung und Wirtschaft, Münster (DE)  
i7  Beleidsmedewerker Economische Zaken en Grensoverschrijdende Samenwerking, 
Regio Acherhoek (NL) 
i8   EUREGIO, Gronau (DE) 
i9   Landkreis Steinfurt, Steinfurt (DE)  
i10  Investitionsbank Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf (DE)  
i11  Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Technologie and Verkehr des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf (DE)  
i12  Kreis Borken, Stabstelle, Bocholt (DE) 
i13  European Commission, DG16, INTERREG II/c (spatial planning), Brussels (BE) 
i14  European Commission, DG16, INTERREG II, Brussels  
i15 European Commission, DG12, Brussels  
i16 European Commission, DG16, Internal inter-regional co-operation (art. 10), Brussels 
i17  European Commission, DG16, art. 10 innovative actions for telematics and the 
information society, Brussels 
i18 LACE-TAP office, Brussels  
i19 European Commission, DG1, Brussels 
i20 European Commission, DG16, Brussels 
 
 
                                              
1 www.euregio.de.  
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2 For additional details on the EUREGIO, cf. Schack’s (1998), Aykaç (1994); Denters, Schobben 
and van der Veen (1998); Murphy (1993); Goinga (1995); IRS (1994). 
3 http://europa.eu.int.   
4 The informal Interessensgemeinschaft (‘community of interest’) Rhein-Ems (1954), replaced by 
the more formal Kommunalgemeinschaft Weser-Ems’ (1962), on the German side; the 
Belangengemeemschap Twente-Gelderland and the Samenwerkningsverband Oost-Gelderland 
(today Regio Achterhoek), on the Dutch side.  
5 ‘… the EUREGIO was already there, it was obvious that they were going to do the programme 
management.’ (i1).  
6 On co-ordination in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’, cf. Scharpf (1996).  
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